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Health care decisions in the United States traditionally have been made
from the perspective of three distinct paradigms: the provider paradigm
(influenced primarily by physicians), the free market paradigm, and the
political paradigm.' The twentieth century has witnessed a dramatic
* Associate Professor, Detroit College of Law at Michigan State University. B.A.,
Emory University; J.D., University of Tennessee; LL.M., Harvard Law School. The author
would like to thank Salwa Dabaja for her excellent research assistance in the preparation of
this article. Special appreciation also is owed to Professor Einer Elhauge of the Harvard Law
School, whose groundbreaking work on the various paradigms in health care decision-making
provided the analytical starting point for this article. All opinions and errors herein are, of
course, solely the author's.
1. Professor Einer Elhauge has identified four paradigms: moral, professional (what
I have more broadly termed as the "provider" paradigm), market, and political. Einer
Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1452 (1994). Although
I agree that all four paradigms theoretically exist, I do not believe that the moral paradigm
identified by Professor Elhauge has ever played a dominant role in American health care
decision-making. Under the moral paradigm, health care is provided any time it is morally
imperative to do so, whether the moral "line" is drawn at absolutism or "adequate" health
care, or somewhere in between. Id. at 1452-55. The moral paradigm has not played a
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evolution in health care decision-making, with each paradigm continuously
struggling for dominance. When one paradigm ultimately succeeds in
gaining dominance, the others recede, but do not disappear. Inevitably, the
weaknesses inherent in the dominant paradigm become obvious and
unbearable, allowing another paradigm to emerge, at least temporarily, as
dominant.
Traditionally, health care decisions in the United States were made
according to the provider paradigm, in which providers-primarily
physicians-held virtually unfettered authority to recommend and treat
patients and were reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis.2 The provider
paradigm dominated health care decision-making for so long because market
defects such as provider-induced demand, lack of quality or cost comparison
information, and the ubiquity of indemnity insurance made it difficult, if not
impossible, for consumers or other purchasers (such as employers) to rebut
providers' treatment recommendations.3
Beginning in the 1970s, however, escalating health care costs forced
Americans to look for alternatives to the provider paradigm. Specifically,
because health care costs under the provider paradigm were virtually
unrestrained, a market was created for alternative delivery systems that
promised cost savings. Organizational structures and mechanisms designed
to contain health care costs-most notably the health maintenance organiza-
tion (HIO)4-becane attractive alternatives for employers and other health
dominant role in American health care decision-making because, in its absolutist form, it
simply costs too much. In its watered-down form of mandating "adequate" or "basic" health
care, the moral paradigm cannot dominate health care decision-making because moral
agreement as to "basic" health care is realistically impossible. Indeed, to the extent that
agreement may be had concerning the definition of "basic" health care, that agreement would
most likely be the result of the dominance of the political paradigm, not the moral paradigm.
2. See generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE, BOOK ONE: A SOVEREIGN PROFESSION (1982); Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient
and Physician Autonomy: Conflicting Rights and Obligations in the Physician-Patient
Relationship, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 47 (1993).
"Fee-for-service" is the term used to describe a payment method whereby the provider
establishes a fee for a given service and is reimbursed accordingly by the payer. Under a fee-
for-service system, generally the only cost control mechanism available to the payer is the
imposition of a "usual, customary and reasonable" limitation, in which the payer will pay
only what similar physicians in a similar locality would charge for the service. See CLARK
C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 1033 (1988).
3. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE 326-30 (1991).
4. The term "health maintenance organization" was first coined by Dr. Paul Ellwood,
Jr., the founder of the Jackson Hole Group (a health reform discussion group) and the
Foundation for Accountability (an organization dedicated to furthering quality improvement
in managed care). Lisa Belkin, The Ellwoods: But What About Quality?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
8, 1996 (Magazine), at 68, 70. An HMO is generally defined as an organization that offers
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care purchasers. The interest in and success of the HMO spawned a mind-
numbing explosion of managed care hybrids which were armed and ready
to do battle with unnecessary care: IPAs,5 PPOs, 6 EPOs, 7 POSs,8 and
PHOs. 9 By 1996 approximately fifty-nine million Americans'°-including
three quarters of the working population with health care benefits' '-were
enrolled in managed care plans, and over eighty percent of doctors had
signed contracts with managed care organizations (MCOs). 2 The era of
the provider paradigm ended and was replaced by a market paradigm that
ran virtually unchecked.
comprehensive health benefits to members and pays for the provision of such benefits on a
fixed per capita basis. BARRY R. FURROw ET AL., HEALTH LAW 309 (1995).
5. IPA is the acronym for Independent Practice Association, a managed care
organization that contracts with individual physicians with independent practices. FuRROw
ET AL., supra note 4, at 309. Although the payment methodology varies from IPA to IPA,
the chief characteristic of an IPA is the independence of the physicians, each of whom
maintains his or her own private office. See Marsha R. Gold et al., A National Survey of the
Arrangements Managed-Care Plans Make with Physicians, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1678,
1678 (1995).
6. A PPO, or Preferred Provider Organization, is an organization wherein a selected
network of health care providers offers its services to health care purchasers on a discounted
fee-for-service basis. Jeffrey B. Schwartz, The Preferred Provider Organization as an
Alternate Delivery System, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 149, 150 (1985). A PPO enrollee is allowed
to obtain services from non-network physicians, but may be required to pay higher out-of-
pocket costs and "make a copayment or pay a deductible," such as co-pays, coinsurance, or
deductibles for out-of-network care. Id.
7. An EPO, or Exclusive Provider Organization, is a PPO in which the enrollee is
not covered for care rendered by a non-network physician. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL.,
HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 799 (3d ed. 1997).
8. A POS, or Point of Service plan, is an HMO that permits enrollees to use non-
network providers in exchange for increased enrollee cost sharing. Id.
9. A PHO, or Physician-Hospital Organization, is a joint venture in which one or
more hospitals and one or more groups of physicians combine forces and market their
services to MCOs and other payers, such as self-insured employers. See John D. Blum, The
Evolution of Physician Credentialinginto Managed Care Selective Contracting, 22 AM. J.L.
& MED. 173, 184 (1996); Carl H. Hitchner et al., Integrated Delivery Systems: A Survey of
Organizational Models, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 273, 296 n.95 (1994).
10. See Julie A. Jacob, Local Health Plans Could Top Big HMOs in '97, AM. MED.
NEWS, Jan. 20, 1997, at 3; Nearly One Quarter of Americans Now Enrolled in HMO Plans,
MED. & HEALTH, Oct. 28, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7993740 [hereinafter Nearly One
Quarter]; see also Janet Firshein, Texas- Malpractice Law Bites Managed Care-Plans,
LANCET, June 14, 1997, at 1753, 1753 (stating that 65 million Americans are enrolled in
HMOs). The dominant managed care model is the IPA, which comprised 44 % of the total
managed care population in 1996. Nearly One Quarter, supra.
11. Geri Aston, HHS: Managed Care Applied Brakes to '95 Health Spending, AM.
MED. NEWS, Feb. 17, 1997, at 5.




Inevitably, perhaps, the freewheeling market paradigm created opportu-
nities for abuse by managed care organizations more interested in the bottom
line than patient care. By the mid-1990s, MCOs came under increasing
attack by critics who claimed that the free market approach to health care
decision-making was too impersonal, too inflexible, and too cost-conscious.
Armed with a spate of horror stories of a free market gone awry, these
critics began capturing the attention of state and federal legislators.
Policymakers on both sides of the political aisle entered the fray, challeng-
ing the supremacy of the free market paradigm by introducing "anti-
managed care" or "managed care reform" legislation designed to minimize
perceived abuses.
The recent ascendancy of the political paradigm as the dominating
influence in health care decision-making is a natural evolutionary reaction
to the unrestrained market paradigm. And although a certain degree of
political intrusion into the health care marketplace is both necessary and
useful, it has the potential to unravel the efficiencies and progress achieved
by managed care. It is essential, therefore, that health care policymakers
recognize the limited utility of political intervention in the health care
market and consciously strive to achieve a proper equilibrium between
provider, patient, and payer. Overzealous political intervention in the name
of "reform" may cause the health care decision-making pendulum to swing
back to the provider paradigm, with its inherent tendency to escalate health
care costs and diminish access.
One possible way to achieve decision-making equilibrium and end the
cycling of extremist mono-paradigmatic dominance is to inject into the
provider-patient-payer triad a neutral third party, a fiduciary whose duty is
to guard the best interests of the patient, to stand as an informed agent
between the financially self-interested provider and payer. This article will
explore the recent ascendancy of the political paradigm, address its
shortcomings, and offer suggestions for implementing a new health care
decision-making process for the twenty-first century-the fiduciary
paradigm.
II. THE RISE OF THE POLITICAL PARADIGM
A. Problems of the Market Paradigm
The market paradigm's dominance is approaching its nadir because its
inherent incentive for underutilization poses a significant risk to patients
when unchecked by regulatory limits. The anecdotal harms which have
occurred thus far have received intense media attention. In a recent popular
movie, actress Helen Hunt won an Oscar for her portrayal of a single
mother who encounters difficulty seeking care from an HMO for her
asthmatic son. In one scene, an enraged Hunt spews obscenities accusing
[Vol. 65:619
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the HMO of being more interested in profit than her son's health. In many
theatres, Hunt's rage draws applause from empathetic audience members.' 3
Hunt's fictitional frustration with managed care has real-life analogs.
For example, in October 1996, in the case of Grijalva v. Shalala,14 a U.S.
district court judge granted summary judgment to a plaintiff class comprised
of Medicare HMO beneficiaries who sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against the Secretary of Health and Human Services for failing to enforce
the statutory appeal rights of Medicare HMO enrollees." Specifically, the
plaintiffs asserted that the Medicare HMOs in which they were enrolled
intentionally delayed the claims appeal process by failing to provide ade-
quate notice of a coverage denial, leaving enrollees unable to pursue their
appeal rights in a timely manner. 16 In granting summary judgment for the
plaintiffs, the judge concluded that the HMOs' internal reconsideration
processes
approximate[d] a"rubber stamp" of the [HMOs'] initial denial ... and...
that existing reconsideration procedures followed by HMOs fail to secure
minimum due process for Medicare beneficiaries. Notice and informal
hearing requirements set forth by statute and regulations are all but
ignored. The existing system fails to provide "a meaningful opportunity"
to present the claim "at a meaningful time."'"
Dilatory HMO appeal tactics were also the focus of a June 1997
decision by the California Supreme Court, which ruled that substantial
evidence existed that Kaiser Permanente-the second largest MCO in the
country 18-committed fraud by intentionally dragging its heels in an
internal arbitration dispute with an enrollee.19 Specifically, the enrollee
brought an arbitration claim against Kaiser after he was diagnosed with lung
cancer, claiming his physician's five-year misdiagnosis had caused
irreparable harm. 0 After filing the arbitration claim, however, Kaiser
engaged in dilatory tactics, refusing to agree to the appointment of a neutral
arbitrator for nearly five months, despite language in its enrollment contract
which stated that all arbitrators "shall" be selected within sixty days of the
demand for arbitration. 2' As a result of Kaiser's delay, the enrollee was
13. Susan Brink, HMOs Were the Right Rx, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 9,
1998, at 47.
14. 946 F. Supp. 747 (D. Ariz. 1996).
15. Id. at 749, 760-61.
16. Id. at 749-50.
17. Id. at 759.
18. Nearly One Quarter, supra note 10 (noting that as of January 1, 1996, the Blue
Cross/Blue Shield System was ranked first with 10,134,592 members and Kaiser Foundation
Health Plans was ranked second with 6,924,080 members).
19. Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d.903, 908 (Cal. 1997).
20. Id. at 908-09.
21. Id. at 910-11.
1998]
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unable to resolve his dispute before he died.2 The court viewed evidence
of an independent analysis of Kaiser arbitration data which found that,
despite contractual language promising selection of arbitrators within sixty
days, it took Kaiser 674 days, on average, to appoint a neutral arbitrator to
resolve coverage disputes." The California Supreme Court concluded that
the evidence of knowing misrepresentation was "plain,"24 and that "there
[was] evidence that Kaiser established a self-administered arbitration system
in which delay for its own benefit and convenience was an inherent part,
despite express and implied contractual representations to the contrary.' 25
Thus, the court ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial
court's denial of Kaiser's motion to compel arbitration on grounds of
fraudulent inducement.26
Moreover, in late April 1997, Kaiser Permanente paid a $1 million
settlement with the Texas Department of Insurance, which had alleged that
Kaiser had routinely retrospectively denied coverage for emergency room
care and had faulty quality assurance mechanisms. 7 In July 1997, an
arbitration judge in California awarded $1.1 million against a small HMO,
Inter Valley Health Plan, for refusing to refer its enrollee, Joyce Ramey, to
a kidney specialist, despite the recommendation of her primary care
physician. 8 The willful refusal to refer Ramey, which caused permanent
kidney failure, led the arbitration judge to take the unusual step of imposing
$100,000 in punitive damages in addition to $1 million in compensatory
damages. 9
In yet another California case, parents have brought suit against the
giant HMO PacifiCare, asserting an action for torture and alleging that the
HMO denied home health care to their infant son, who suffered from a
congenital heart defect.3" Specifically, the complaint alleges that, in order
to maximize profits, PacifiCare intentionally refused continued home health
22. Id. at 912.
21 Id. at 913.
24. Id. at 917.
25. Id. at 918.
26. Id. at 921-22.
27. See David R. Olmos, Texas Regulators Assail Kaiser on Physicians, Care, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 1997, at D1; Kathy Walt, State Report Rips Health Care Giant; Kaiser
Permanente's Refusal to Pay Cited, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 23, 1997, available in 1997 WL
6552759.
28. David R. Olmos, Pomona HMO Found Liable in MalpracticeCase, L.A. TIMES,
July 10, 1997, at DI. The suit was not barred by ERISA because the plaintiff was not
enrolled in the HMO through an employer-sponsored health plan, but rather through
Medicare. Id.
29. Id.
30. Jay Greene, Family Sues HMO for Torture for Denying Care, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, June 13, 1997, at 3C.
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care for the infant, knowing its actions would cause imminent death.3'
Although the legal theory employed in this case (torture) is unusual, 32 it
reflects the increasingly emotional tone of the backlash against MCO cost-
containment practices and the growing creativity of plaintiffs' lawyers in
devising causes of action.
These kinds of anecdotal cases have taken their toll on the public's
perception of managed care. A November 1996 poll conducted by the
Harvard School of Public Health and the Kaiser Family Foundation found
that fifty-four percent of Americans believe that the "government needs to
protect consumers from being treated unfairly and not getting the care they
should from managed-care plans. 33  Moreover, a February 1997 poll
conducted by Louis Harris and Associates found that thirty-eight percent of
Americans believe MCOs "generally do a ... bad job of serving their
customers. 34 Even the "father" of managed care, Dr. Paul Ellwood Jr.,35
has publicly admitted that "we are reaching the point where we need to have
some sort of quality assurance mechanism that assures the public they are
getting reasonably good care from HMOs. 3 6  Empirically, a study
published in The Journal of the American Medical Association in October
1996"7 concluded that vulnerable subpopulations of Medicare HMO
enrollees- such as the elderly, the poor, and those with chronic conditions
or deteriorating health-had inferior health when compared with similar
subpopulations enrolled in fee-for-service Medicare.38
31. Id.
32. The lawyer for the family believes that an HMO had never before been sued
under a California criminal torture statute. ld.
33. See David S. Hilzenrath, Backlash Builds over Managed Care Frustrated
Consumers Push for Tougher Laws, WASH. POST, June 30, 1997, at Al.
34. See id.
35. See Belkin, supra note 4, at 68.
36. Should NCQA Become a FederalAgency?, MED. & HEALTH, Dec. 16, 1996, at
3,3.
37. John E. Ware et al., Differencesin 4- Year Health OutcomesforElderlyand Poor,
Chronically Ill Patients Treated in HMO and Fee-for-Service Systems, 276 JAMA 1039
(1996).
38. See id. at 1039. But see Statement of Medicare and Quality of Care for the
American Association of Health Plans Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human
Services and Educ. of the Senate Appropriations Comm., Nov. 13 1996, available in 1996
WL 667420 (statement of William A. Maclain) [hereinafter Maclain] (citing various studies
indicating that seniors enrolled in Medicare HMOs are equally or more satisfied than their
fee-for-service counterparts); Statement on Safeguarding the Health Care of Senior Citizens
Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Educ. of the Senate
Appropriations Comm., Nov. 13, 1996, available in 1996 WL 667417 (statement of Gail R.
Wilensky, Chair of the Physician Payment Review Commission (PPRC)) (reporting results
of the PPRC's survey of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in HMOs which indicated high
overall satisfaction levels).
1998]
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B. Enter the Politicians
The high degree of negative attention on managed care has drawn
intense political interest.39 The natural political response to consumer and
provider complaints about managed care has been to pass legislation
mandating expanded benefits and increasing provider autonomy, a response
which, if unrestrained, eventually will cause health care costs to rise and
access to diminish, signaling a return to the dominance of the provider
paradigm.
1. "Drive-Through" Deliveries
Perhaps the first evil targeted by lawmakers was the so-called "drive-
through delivery," wherein some MCOs routinely required that new mothers
be discharged from the hospital shortly after giving birth.4° Media reports
of mothers who were forced by MCOs to leave the hospital as early as six
hours after delivery sparked public anger and captured the attention of
lawmakers looking for a politically safe 'motherhood and apple pie'
issue.4 In response, the majority of state legislatures quickly passed laws
mandating that MCOs permit mothers to stay in the hospital for a minimum
number of days.42 In September 1996 President Clinton signed into law
a bill, effective in 1998, requiring all ERISA 43 health plans to cover a
39. See generally Federal Legislation Relating to Health Care Quality: Hearing
Before the Senate Labor and Human Resources Comm., 105th Cong. (1998).
40. Hilzenrath, supra note 33, at A6.
4 1. See Leigh Page, State Legislators Spent Busy Year Trying to Manage Managed
Care, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 9, 1996, at 3 (quoting Geri Dallek, policy analyst for Families
USA, an advocacy group for children and families).
42. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.347 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
20-1057(s) (West Supp. 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-99-404 (Michie 1997); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 38a-503c(a) (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-58.1 (1997); 215
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/356s (West Supp. 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 514C. 12 (West Supp.
1997); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-145 (Michie 1996); MD. CODE ANN., INS. CODE §
490HH (1996); MFNN. STAT. ANN. § 62A.0411 (West Supp. 1996); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3216
(McKinney Supp. 1997); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. 21-53F(4)(a) (West Supp. 1998); see also
Christina Kent, It's Unanimous: Senate Curbs "Drive-Through Deliveries, "AM. MED. NEWS,
Sept. 23, 1996, at 3 (stating that, at the time the Senate passed the federal law in September
1996, 28 states had passed laws mandating a minimum 48-hour hospital stay following
delivery).
43. ERISA is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. & 29
U.S.C.). ERISA is a federal law that establishes standards for employer-sponsored pension
and benefit plans, including health benefit plans. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 4, at 516.
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minimum of two days' hospitalization after vaginal deliveries and a
minimum of four days' hospitalization after caesarean delivery.44
2. "Drive-Through" Mastectomies
After the adoption of laws mandating minimum hospital stays for
deliveries, consumer and provider groups turned their attention to a new
cause: outpatient mastectomies--dubbed "drive-through mastectomies."
State legislators again took the lead, successfully passing laws that required
MCOs to cover inpatient mastectomies and corresponding minimum lengths
of stay.45 Federal legislators jumped on this bandwagon as well, introduc-
ing several bills to mandate inpatient mastectomy coverage and minimum
lengths of stay.46 In his State of the Union address in February 1997,
President Clinton formally recognized Dr. Kristen Zarfos, a Connecticut
surgeon vocally opposed to outpatient mastectomies, and joined the growing
chorus of opposition:
Just as we ended drive-through deliveries of babies last year, we must now
end the dangerous and demeaning practice of forcing women home from
the hospital only hours after a mastectomy. I ask your support for
bipartisan legislation to guarantee that a woman can stay in the hospital for
48 hours after a mastectomy.
47
Despite this political momentum, a recent study conducted by the
Medstat Group of Ann Arbor, Michigan, for the American Association of
Health Plans (AAHP)48 indicated that the percentage of patients having
outpatient breast cancer surgery in 1993 and 1994 was virtually identical for
individuals enrolled in traditional fee-for-service insurance plans versus
44. Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204,
§ 603(a)(5), 110 Stat. 2874, 2935-38 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185 (a)(l)(A)(i)-(ii) (West
Supp. 1997)).
45. As of April 1, 1997, 26 states had introduced bills regulating coverage of
mastectomies. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-99-405 (Michie Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 59A-46.41.1 (Michie 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 6060.5(d) (West Supp.
1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-41-43.1 (Supp. 1997); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.52G(3)(a)(1)
(West Supp. 1998); 1997 Conn. Acts 97-198 § (1)(a) (Reg. Sess.).
46. See, e.g., H.R. 135, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 249, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 143,
105th Cong. (1997); see also H.R. 164, 105th Cong. (1997) (requiring health plans to pay
for reconstructive breast surgery if they cover mastectomies).
47. "We Must Be Shapers of Events, Not Observers "; "We Must Rise to a New Test
of Leadership," WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1997, at A19 (quoting President Clinton's February
1997 State of the Union address).
48. AAHP is a trade association located in Washington, D.C., which represents the




managed care organizations. 49 Thus, as a matter of public policy, presently
there is scant empirical evidence that managed care has created perverse
incentives for the performance of outpatient mastectomies.
But empirical evidence is unlikely to dampen the zeal of managed care
reformers. Anecdotal horror stories provide all the political fuel necessary
to sustain a prolonged period of political success. Indeed, in February 1997,
the Department of Health and Human Services, which contracts with MCOs
under the Medicare program, notified all MCOs holding managed care
contracts that, as a condition of contract renewal, the Department would
forbid plans from imposing outpatient mastectomies on their enrollees."
Rather than imposing a minimum length of stay, the new HHS policy
requires that the decision as to the location and subsequent length of stay for
mastectomy surgery be left up to the patient, in consultation with her
physician."
The new HHS policy is clearly a reaction to political pressure from
consumer and provider groups and may have a significant spillover effect
into other contracts MCOs have with private payers, such as employers.1
2
Perhaps in an attempt to ward off federal legislation applicable to all MCOs,
the managed care industry's trade association announced an official policy
in November 1996 that its member plans "'should not require outpatient
care for removal of a breast."' 53  Instead, in conformity with the new
Medicare policy, member plans should allow physicians to make such
decisions in consultation with their patients. 4
3. "Gag" Clauses
The political paradigm also has focused on the so-called "gag clauses"
contained in most early managed care contracts with providers. Gag clauses
typically state that the provider "shall agree not to take any action or make
49. Geri Aston, Opposition to OutpatientMastectomyMounts, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar.
3, 1997, at 1. Specifically, the Medstat Group study revealed that partial mastectomies were
conducted on an outpatient basis for 19% of patients in indemnity plans as well as capitated
plans. Id. Simple mastectomies were performed on an outpatient basis for 22% of enrollees
in indemnity plans, versus 21% of enrollees in capitated health care plans. Id. Likewise,
radical or modified radical mastectomies were performed on an outpatient basis for 7% of
indemnity enrollees versus 8% of capitated enrollees. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Medicare, the federal health care program for the elderly, pays for about one-third
of all mastectomies performed in the United States. Id.
53. SpeedierProceduresRaiseRegulatoryHackles, MED. & HEALTH, Nov. 18, 1996,
at 2, available in 1996 WL 7993717 (quoting the Board of the American Association of
Health Plans); see also Leigh Page, Managed Care Reforms Remain Focus of State
Lawmakers, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 27, 1997, at 3.
54. Speedier Procedures Raise Regulatory Hackles, supra note 53.
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any communication which undermines or could undermine the confidence
of enrollees, potential enrollees, their employers, their unions, or the public
in [this MCO] or the quality of [this MCO's] coverage." 5 Many providers
have interpreted these gag clauses as prohibiting them from informing their
patients about the MCOs' provider reimbursement methodology or treatment
options which are not covered by the MCO because such information could
undermine the confidence of enrollees in the quality of the managed care
organization's coverage.16 Opponents of gag clauses view them as infring-
ing upon the professional autonomy of physicians and as violative of the
Hippocratic Oath, by which physicians pledge to act "for the benefit of the
sick according to [their] ability and judgment."57
The backlash against gag clauses was so severe that Time magazine
boldly printed a picture of a gagged physician on the cover of its January
8, 1996 issue.58 By the end of June 1997, over thirty states had enacted
legislative bans on gag clauses. 9 In late February 1997, the Clinton
Administration announced that it will not allow MCOs contracting with
Medicaid-the federal-state health care program for the poor-to include
gag clauses in their provider contracts.60 In announcing the policy,
President Clinton proclaimed that "[f]amilies facing illness simply should
not have to worry that the doctor they trust does not have the freedom to
tell them what they need to know.' This regulation was explicitly
codified in the 1997 budget bill,62 which also imposed a similar ban upon
MCOs contracting with the Medicare63 program.64
55. Paul Gray, Gagging the Doctors, TiME, Jan. 8, 1996, at 50, 50 (quoting a
managed care contract between U.S. Healthcare and Dr. David Himmelstein, a vocal
opponent of such gag clauses).
56. Id.
57. 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICs 2632 (Warren Thomas Reich ed., rev. ed. 1995).
58. TIME, Jan. 8, 1996.
59. Hilzenrath, supra note 33, at Al (citing data compiled by Families USA).
60. Geri Aston, Your Right to Talk to Patients, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 10, 1997, at
1.
61. Id.
62. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4704(b)(3)(A), 111 Stat.
251, 496 (1997) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 13966-2(b)(3)(a) (West Supp. 1997)).
63. Medicare is a federal program which provides health care to the elderly.
Approximately 11% of Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in HMOs. TestimonyBefore the
Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Servicesof the Senate Appropriations Comm., Nov.
13, 1996, at 2, available in 1996 WL 667419 (statement of Geraldine Dallek, Director of
Health Policy, Families USA). However, enrollment in Medicare HMOs is growing at a rate
of about 80,000 to 90,000 beneficiaries per month, or approximately 35% per year.
MacBain, supra note 38.
64. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, § 4704, 111 Stat. at 295 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A.




In an effort to curb the trend of legislatively imposed managed care
mandates, many large MCOs voluntarily deleted gag clauses from their
provider contracts. 65 Likewise, the managed care industry's trade associa-
tion has announced a "Patients First" initiative which encourages MCOs to
make publicly available all information regarding coverage decision
methodology, including utilization review66 and physician payment
structure and incentives.67 The industry's effort to derail legislative action
is likely futile, since banning gag clauses is perceived as pro-consumer and
pro-free speech, thus providing a big political payoff with relatively minimal
adverse impact on the managed care industry.
4. Other Miscellaneous Piecemeal Reforms
Other piecemeal legislative reform efforts have succeeded at both the
state and federal levels. At the federal level, for example, the Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA) has issued final HMO "sunshine"
regulations, effective January 1, 1997, which require public disclosure of
any physician payment incentives used by HMOs that contract with
Medicare or Medicaid. 68  The regulation also requires Medicare or
Medicaid HMOs to provide or otherwise ensure the existence of minimum
levels of stop-loss insurance coverage for contracting physicians, who are
shall not prohibit or otherwise restrict a covered health care professional . . . from
advising such an individual who is a patient of the professional about the health status
of the individual or medical care or treatment for the individual's condition or disease,
regardless of whether benefits for such care or treatment are provided under the plan,
if the professional is acting within the lawful scope of practice.
Id. § 4001, 111 Stat. at 295. The budget bill was signed into law by President Clinton on
Aug. 5, 1997. The inclusion of this Medicare gag clause prohibition should not have come
as a surprise. A bipartisan bill, the "Patient Right to Know Act," introduced by Reps. Greg
Ganske (R-IA) and Edward Markey (D-MA), had garnered over 280 cosponsors-more than
a majority of the House--and was publicly supported by President Clinton. H.R. 586, 105th
Cong. § 2(a)(1) (1997); see Aston, supra note 60, at 1.
65. Sharon McIlrath, New Restrictionson HMOs?: Congress Looking at Gag Rules,
'Drive Through' Mastectomies, AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 2, 1996, at 1.
66. Utilization Review (UR) is a process of determining whether a claim for health
care benefits should be paid (prospective UR) or whether a claim should have been paid
(retrospective UR). See Andrew Ruskin, Capitation: The Legal Implications of Using
Capitation to Affect Physician Decision-Making Processes, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 391, 409 n.108 (1997).
67. Health Plans to Disclose Doctor Pay Methods, Utilization Management Criteria,
Under Big New AAHP Campaign, MED. & HEALTH, Dec. 16, 1996, at 1, I; see also Putting
Patients First (visited Aug. 12, 1997) <http://www.aahp.org/menus/index.cfm>.
68. 61 Fed. Reg. 69,034, 69,050 (1996) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 417.479).
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deemed to be at substantial financial risk.69 These regulations were
codified by Congress as part of the 1997 budget bill.70
Moreover, in late April 1997, in response to the decision in Grijalva v.
Shalala,7" the Health Care Financing Administration issued a final regula-
tion to address the concern of Medicare HMO enrollees that their health
plans were engaging in purposeful foot-dragging on appeals of coverage
denials.72  The new regulation requires all MCOs contracting with
Medicare to decide appeals regarding urgently needed care within seventy-
two hours." Moreover, if the MCO denies the appeal, the Medicare
beneficiary may appeal to an HCFA contractor, who then must review the
MCO's decision within ten days.74 Perhaps not wishing to forego political
credit for this decision, Congress explicitly codified this final regulation in
the 1997 budget bill.75
The 1997 budget bill included several additional important piecemeal
reforms for both Medicare and Medicaid MCOs. Specifically, with regard
to both Medicare and Medicaid MCOs, the budget bill required that
emergency services be covered "without regard to prior authorization or the
emergency care provider's contractual relationship with the organization.,
76
This language thus prohibits the use of prior authorization for emergency
services and mandates payment for such services without regard to whether
the provider belongs to the MCO's network. More significantly, the Act
defines an "emergency medical condition" as a "medical condition
manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe
pain)" according to the perspective of the "prudent layperson, who possesses
an average knowledge of health and medicine, [and] could reasonably expect
the absence of immediate medical attention to result in: (i) placing the health
of the individual ... in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment to bodily
functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part. 77
69. Id. at 60,049.
70. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4001, 111 Stat. 251, 296-97
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395W-22 (West Supp. 1997)). The new law also prohibits
Medicare MCOs from using indemnification clauses in their contracts with providers if the
indemnification would result from a civil suit "brought for any damage caused to an enrollee
... by the organization's denial of medically necessary care." Id. 1997 Conn. Acts 97-198
§ (l)(a) (Reg. Sess.); § 4001, 111 Stat. at 297.
71. 946 F. Supp. 747 (D. Ariz. 1996); see supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
72. 62 Fed. Reg. 23,368 (1997) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 417).
73. Id. at 23,375 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 417.617). The regulation became
effective June 30, 1997. Id. at 23,368 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 417).
74. Id. The anticipated cost of the new regulation is approximately $60 million per
year. Id. at 23,374.
75. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, § 4001, 111 Stat. at 294.
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This reform was successful in large part due to pressure from consumer
and provider organizations who complained that MCOs were routinely
retrospectively denying reimbursement for emergency visits." The
common illustration of this problem is the patient who arrives at the
emergency room, complaining of chest pains thought to indicate the onset
of a heart attack, but who is determined to suffer only from a bad case of
indigestion.79 Under the new law, an MCO with a Medicare contract
would have to reimburse such emergency room visits, so long as a prudent
layperson would think that failure to seek emergency help would result in
serious harm. °
Other significant reforms in the 1997 budget bill include a ban on all
gag clauses in provider contracts with Medicare or Medicaid MCOs,
mandatory expedited appeals procedures for emergency care, 2 mandatory
annual quality reviews of Medicare and Medicaid MCOs by independent,
third-party reviewers, 3 and a requirement that Medicaid MCOs meet
minimum state solvency requirements.8 4 While these reforms help to
palliate the most vocal concerns of managed care critics, they do not have
to be applied to MCO enrollees who are not Medicare or Medicaid
beneficiaries, such as those who purchase individual health policies or who
receive health benefits through the workplace.8 5
State legislators have eagerly attempted to fill this regulatory void. As
of April 1, 1997, some eight hundred managed care reform bills had been
introduced, 6 most of which addressed narrowly defined abuses. Missouri,
for example, passed a law in 1996 which established minimum standards for
utilization review (UR) agencies, including a requirement that all coverage
denial decisions be made by a licensed physician, 7 and that all UR
78. Geri Aston, Emergency Care Standards Seen as Step Forward, but Not Enough,
AM. MED. NEws, Feb. 17, 1997, at 1.
79. See id.
80. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, § 4001, II Stat. at 290.
81. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
83. Balanced Budget Act of 1997 § 4705, 111 Stat. at 498 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1396a-2 (West Supp. 1997)).
84. Id. § 4706, !11 Stat. at 501.
85. An estimated 10.4 million Americans receive health insurance through individual
policies and 145.7 million Americans receive health insurance through the workplace. See
Statement of the Health Insurance Association ofAmerica on the Cost of Group-to-Individual
Portability Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Commerce Comm., Mar. 7, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 134455 (statement of Thomas F. Wildsmith).
86. Leslie Werstein Hann, Building New Walls Around Managed Care: Managed
Care Legislation 1997, BEST's REV., May 1997, at 50, 50 (citing figures obtained from the
Health Policy Tracking Service of the National Conference of State Legislatures, Washington,
D.C.).
87. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 374.510.3 (West 1996).
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agencies provide an appeal mechanism which resolves all appeals within
thirty days, or, in the case of an emergency, two business days.8" The
Connecticut legislature passed a virtually identical UR reform law in
1997.89
Several states have enacted so-called "any willing provider" statutes,90
which require MCOs to contract with any provider who is willing to enter
into a contract and who meets the MCOs standard for participation.9'
Access to cutting edge therapies is increasingly the focus of reformers, who
complain that MCOs too often deny coverage to such therapies on grounds
that they are "experimental. 92 A widely publicized lawsuit filed against
Health Net by the family of an enrollee, Nelene Fox, captured the attention
of California lawmakers. 93 Fox's estate claimed that the MCO wrongfully
denied coverage for a bone marrow treatment for her breast cancer on
grounds that it was experimental and thereby caused her death.94 The Fox
lawsuit ultimately resulted in an unprecedented $89 million verdict-
including $77 million in punitive damages 95-against Health Net, although
the case was later settled out of court for a lesser sum.96 A landmark
California law passed in late 1996 attempts to ensure the Fox tragedy is not
repeated by requiring that all MCOs and other health insurers permit
enrollees to obtain independent, third-party review of any benefit claim
denied as "experimental" treatment.97 Such outside review for experimen-
88. Id. § 374.510.1(3)(b)-(c).
89. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-226c (West Supp. 1997). As of the time this
article was written, Governor John Rowland was expected to sign H.B. 6883 into law. See
Texas, Connecticut, Florida, Arizona Laws Hit HMOs on Malpractice, External Review,
MANAGED CARE WK., June 2, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9048550.
90. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-18-17(b) (Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE § 41-3927.1
(1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2202(c) (West 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176B,
§ 3 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-22-1704(3) (1995); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 59A-46-35 (Michie 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3407(B) (Michie 1994). Several
other states are considering enacting such legislation. See Hann, supra note 86, at 50.
91. See WILLIAM J. CURRAN ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 880 (4th ed. 1990); Alice G. Gosfield, Who Is Holding Whom Accountable
for Quality?, 16 HEALTH AFF. 26, 31 (1997).
92. California Law to Expand Access to Experimental Care, AM. MED. NEWS, Oct.
14, 1996, at 24 [hereinafter California Law].
93. Berkeley Rice, Look Who's on the MalpracticeHot Seat Now: But Don't Think
Doctors Are off the Hook, MED. ECON., Aug. 12, 1996, at 192, 199.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.; see also Thomas William Malone & Deborah Haas Thaler, Managed Health
Care: A Plaintiff'sPerspective,32 TORT & INS. L.J. 123, 140 (1996); Richard C. Reuben,
In Pursuit of Health, 82 A.B.A. J. 54, 55 (1996); Jane Bryant Quinn, Prognosis Is Poor on
Suits Against HMOs, WASH. POST, June 1, 1997, at H2.
97. See California Law, supra note 92, at 24.
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tal treatments must be conducted by a panel of physicians, whose decision
will be binding on the payer.9
C. Comprehensive Market Reform
1. State Efforts
While the "abuse of the month" approach to managed care reform is
potentially minacious to the continued viability of managed care, the more
serious long-term threat comes from emerging, broad-based reform efforts,
particularly those efforts aimed at restricting the use of capitation99 or
closed provider panels. °° As of April 1, 1997, twenty-six states had
introduced comprehensive reform bills. 1 ' These comprehensive bills have
met with mixed success. Anti-managed care ballot initiatives in both
Oregon and California were narrowly defeated in November 1996.102
Oregon Measure 35 would have banned the use of capitation to pay
physicians. 1 3  California's defeated Propositions 214 and 216104 would
have, inter alia, outlawed the use of physician bonuses and withholds' 5
98. Id.
99. In a 1994 survey of 108 managed care plans, 56% of IPAs and 34% of group-or
staff-model HMOs used capitation as the primary payment method for primary care
physicians. Gold et al., supra note 5, at 1681.
100. A recent survey found that 39% of MCOs admitted that physician utilization
patterns had a moderate or large influence on their decision to enter into a contractual
arrangement. Id. at 1680.
101. Hann, supra note 86, at 50.
102. User-FriendlyHMOs Could Stem Tide of Laws in West, MED. & HEALTH, Nov.
18, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7993731. Proposition 214 was defeated by a 58-42%
margin. Id. Proposition 2.16, which contained essentially the same reforms as Proposition
214, in addition to specifying certain taxes on the health care industry, was defeated by a
larger margin, 61-39%. Id.
103. See David R. Olmos, Election '96: Experts Foresee More Efforts to Reform HMO
Regulation, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996, at D34; Joanne Wojcik, Managed Care Survives Votes,
Bus. INS., Nov. 11, 1996, at 61. Measure35 was supported by only 35% of Oregon voters.
Id.
104. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
105. See California Props. 214, 216 (1996), available in WESTLAW, Ca-Legis-Old
Database; see also Robert Pear, Stakes High As California Debates Ballot Issues to Rein In
H.M.O. 's, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1996, at Al. A bonus is the payment of a certain sum of
money at the end of a set period, often based upon the number of specialist referrals made
by a particular physician or the overall profits of the MCO during that period. See MARC
A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 140
(1993). Withholds, by contrast, are the mirror image of bonuses. They are a certain sum of
money which is withheld from the physician as a reserve for referral or other expenses. See
Lauren M. Walker, Turn Capitation into a Moneymaker, MED. ECON., Mar. 13, 1995, at 58,
68.
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and mandated that MCOs and other insurers pay for health services
recommended by a physician unless they obtained (and paid for) a contrary
second opinion." 6  Likewise, in Missouri, a comprehensive MCO reform
law was vetoed by the-Governor due to fear of its potential adverse impact
on health care costs.
0 7
Despite these defeats, the momentum appears to be on the side of
comprehensive reform, which is emerging as an attractive alternative to
piecemeal legislation.' 8 Several states have been successful in enacting
comprehensive reform. For example, Texas recently made national head-
lines by passing a bill which, for the first time, provides an explicit, direct
malpractice action against MCOs for injuries suffered as a result of denied
coverage.'0 9 A successful companion bill imposed additional reforms,
such as requiring all MCOs to obtain a certificate of authority from the State
Department of Insurance;"0 banning gag clauses;"' establishing mini-
106. See Pear, supra note 105, at Al.
107. See Hann, supra note 86, at 50.
108. See generally Geri Aston, Regulating Care: New Managed Care Bills Prompt
Questions About Federal Oversight, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 17, 1997, at 1.
109. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(a) (West Supp. 1998).
Governor George Bush allowed the Texas MCO liability law to take effect without his
signature, due to concerns that the imposition of liability on MCOs might make managed care
unaffordable for some Texans. Frank Bass, HMOs in Texas to Be Made Liable for
Malpractice, WALL ST. J., May 23, 1997, at D3; Sam Howe Verhovek, Texas Allowing Suits
Against H.M.O. 's: State Will Be the First to Permit Consumer Claims for Malpractice, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 1997, at A16.
Similar bills are currently being considered by Congress. See H.R. 1719, 105th Cong.
(1997); H.R. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 820, 105th Cong. § 2789 (1997); S. 644, 105th
Cong. (1997); S. 373, 105th Cong. § 2789 (1997). Several state legislatures, including New
York and California, are also considering similar bills. See Jay Greene, California Bill
Would Hold HMOs Liable for Denying Treatment, ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 12, 1997,
at Cl (stating that S.B. 977, sponsored by Sen. Steve Peace, would define HMO coverage
decisions to be subjected to corporate liability); HMOs to Face MalpracticeSuits Under New
Texas Law, BESTWIRE, June 11, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File
(noting that the California Senate recently passed a bill sponsored by Sen. Herschel Rosenthal
that would permit malpractice actions against MCOs under state law by revising the definition
of "practice of medicine" under the state's corporate practice of medicine doctrine); Tom
Precious, Battle Under Way to Make State HMOs Liable on Care, BUFFALO NEWS, July 27,
1997, at A l.
Aetna is currently challenging the Texas MCO liability law on the grounds that it is
preempted by ERISA. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Aetna Challenges HMO Law in Suit: Statute
Allows MalpracticeClaims, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL
7432491; Linda 0. Prager, Aetna Challenges Texas Law Lifting HMOs'ERISA Shield, AM.
MED. NEWS, July 21, 1997, at 1.
110. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 20A.04 (West Supp. 1998).
111. Id. § 7.
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mum reserve requirements;" l2 requiring mandatory internal quality assur-
ance programs,'13 appeals procedures and expedited appeals for emergency
care;... providing enrollee information regarding benefits and rights;" 5
and setting forth certain termination rights for providers.
16
In March 1997, Idaho also passed a broad reform law which, among
other things, requires that MCOs reimburse care provided by physicians who
are not members of the MCO's network. 1 7 Although an MCO is permit-
ted under the new Idaho law to charge enrollees higher cost-sharing for care
received out-of-network," 8 the imposition of a mandatory point-of-service
option essentially bans the use of traditional, closed-panel HMOs, in which
the enrollee is covered only for care provided by the H[MO's physicians. 1'9
The Idaho law also bans gag clauses, 20 establishes minimum capital
reserve requirements, ' establishes enrollee complaint procedures, 22 and
requires that MCOs allow obstetricians-gynecologists to be primary care
gatekeepers. 1
23
Missouri, which had passed a narrower UR reform measure in 1996,124
passed a sweeping reform bill in 1997 which, inter alia, bans gag claus-
es; 12 requires MCOs to provide mandatory, point-of-service options and
pay for emergency services 126 if a "prudent layperson" (rather than MCO
administrator or physician) would believe care is immediately needed; 127
112. Id. § 13.
113. id. § 28.
114. Id. § 11.
115. Id. § 8.
116. Id. § 19.
117. IDAHO CODE§ 41-3905 (Supp. 1997); see also Julie A. Jacob, New Idaho Law
Includes Mandatory Point-of-ServiceOption, AM. MED. NEWS, May 5, 1997, at 7. A similar
bill was recently approved by the Health, Environment, Welfare, and Institutions Committee
of the Colorado General Assembly by a vote of 10-1. Julie A. Jacob, Colorado Bill Would
Ease HMO Network Restrictions, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 10, 1997, at 9. The Colorado bill,
H.R. 1122, sponsored by State Rep. Marcy Morrison, also contains other reform measures,
such as requiring MCOs to provide adequate access to specialists, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 10-16-704(9)(a)(II1) (West Supp. 1997), and providing consumer information regarding
dispute resolution and appeals, id. § 10- 1 6-704(9)(g)(I), and referral procedures, id. § 10- 16-
704(9)(b)(l)-(V).
118. IDAHO CODE § 41-3915 (Supp. 1997).
119. I d. § 41-3915(5).
120. Id. § 41-3927(4).
121. Id. § 41-3905(2).
122. Id. § 41-3918(1).
123. Id. § 41-3915(2)(e).
124. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
125. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 354.442(2)(10) (West Supp. 1997).
126. Id. § 376.1367.
127. Id. § 354.600.
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imposes binding, independent arbitration for coverage disputes; 28 and
permits enrollees harmed by coverage denials to sue the MCO directly.
29
Governor Chiles of Florida recently signed into law a broad managed care
reform law which bans gag clauses; 3 ' provides for expedited coverage
dispute resolution;' 3 ' and provides for the dissemination of consumer
information relating to coverage, physician payment,' and appeal
rights.' 33
2. Federal Efforts
Federal lawmakers could not be expected to sit idly on the sidelines of
the reform debate. In March 1997, President Clinton appointed a thirty-two
member Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the
Health Care Industry, which issued a report setting forth a health care
consumers' "bill of rights."'34 The report sets forth seven broad rights for
health care consumers:
(1) the right to receive accurate, easily understood information in
making informed health care decisions;
(2) the right to a choice among health care providers that is
sufficient to allow access to appropriate, high-quality health
care;
(3) the right to access emergency health care when necessary
(including a "prudent layperson" standard of when such
emergency care is necessary);
128. Id. § 376.1387.
129. Id. § 376.1378; see also David S. Hilzenrath, Furor by Doctors, Patients Grows
over Managed Care, IDAHO STATESMAN, July 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12709781
(stating that Governor Carnahan signed the bill during the last week in June 1997); Missouri
Considers Ways to Regulate Managed Care, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 3, 1997, at 24; State
Health Week: Missouri Moves to RestrictHMOs, Permit MalpracticeClaims, WASH. HEALTH
WK., June 9, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9047987.
130. 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 159, § 2.
131. Id. § 8.
132. Id. § 9.
133. Id. § 10; see also HMO Accountability Series, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 9,
1997, available in 1997 WL 6202441; Texas, Connecticut, Florida, Arizona Laws Hit HMOs
on Malpractice, ExternalReview, MANAGED CARE WK., June 2, 1997, available in 1997 WL
9048550. The 1997 Florida law, unlike the Missouri law, does not provide for an explicit
direct cause of action against HMOs by enrollees damaged by coverage denials. Governor
Chiles vetoed such a direct action law in 1996 on grounds that it would increase health care
costs. HMO Accountability Series, supra.
134. SeegenerallyADVISORY COMM'N ON CONSUMER PROTECTION & QUALITY IN THE
HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY, CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1997).
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(4) the right to participate fully in one's own health care
decisions;
(5) the right to considerate, respectful, and non-discriminatory
care;
(6) the right to keep confidential all identifiable health care
information (and the corollary right to view one's own
medical records); and
(7) the right to a fair and efficient appeals process for resolving
coverage disputes (including a system of external re-
view). 
35
The Commission's recommendations were endorsed by President
Clinton136 and incorporated into legislation, the Patients' Bill of Rights
Act, sponsored by Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle and Representative
John Dingell. 137  And while a recent poll indicates that seventy-four
percent of Americans support the Commission's recommendations, their
support drops off dramatically when told that the recommended changes
may increase the cost of health insurance or cause some employers to drop
health care coverage.
138
Numerous other managed care reform bills have been introduced in the
105th Congress. 39  Perhaps the most significant comprehensive reform
bills thus far are the Kennedy-Dingell bill, 40 and a Republican analog, the
Patient Access to Responsible Care Act (PARCA), introduced by Senator
Alfonse D'Amato and Representative Charles Norwood. 4 ' Both bills
would prohibit prior authorization and require the use of a prudent layperson
135. Id.
136. See Letter to Congressional Leaders on the "Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 1998,"
34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DoC. 549 (Mar. 31, 1998).
137. SeeS. 1891, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 1890, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 3605, 105th
Cong. (1998).
138. Kaiser/Harvard National Survey of Americans' Views on Consumer Protection
inManaged(Jan.2 1,1998)<http://www.kff.orglkff/library.html?documentkey=2059&data_
typekey=301> [hereinafter National Survey]. Specifically, when told that the reforms might
increase the cost of health insurance, support dropped to 33%; when told it might cause some
employers to drop health coverage for workers, support dropped to 15%. Id.
139. See, e.g., S. 701, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 386, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1222,
105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 815, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 66, 105th Cong. (1997).
140. Health Insurance Bill of Rights Act of 1997, S. 373, 105th Cong. (1997) (intro-
duced by Sen. Kennedy); Health Insurance Bill of Rights Act of 1997, H.R. 820, 105th Cong.
(1997) (introduced by Rep. Dingell as the House version of S. 373).
141. Patient Access to Responsible Care Act, S. 644, 105th Cong. (1997) (introduced
by Sen. D'Amato); Patient Access to Responsible Care Act, H.R. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997)
(introduced by Rep. Norwood as the House version of S. 644). As of the time this article
went to press, the House version of PARCA, H.R. 1415, had over 225 cosponsors-more
than a majority of the House of Representatives.
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standard for emergency care, 142 ensure direct access to certain special-
ists,'43 ban gag clauses, 4' and mandate internal quality assurance pro-
grams. 14 ' The bills would also amend the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) 41 to permit MCO enrollees who are harmed by
coverage denials to bring a direct malpractice suit against the MCO.'47
Several courts have held that such direct malpractice actions, even when
available, 148 are preempted by ERISA on grounds that such suits "relate to"
an employee benefit plan. 4 9 Thus, the leading federal bills would make
it clear that statutes authorizing direct malpractice suits-such as the one
recently passed in Texasl°-would not be preempted by ERISA.
The combined force of piecemeal and comprehensive MCO reform
legislation at both the federal and state levels will ineluctably erode the
political paradigm's dominance. The expanded benefits and increased
142. S. 373 § 2771; H.R. 820 § 2771; S. 644 § 2771; H.R. 1415 § 2771.
143. S. 373 § 2772; H.R. 820 § 2772; S. 644 § 2772; H.R. 1415 § 2772.
144. S. 373 § 2787; H.R. 820 § 2787; S. 644 § 2774; H.R. 1415 § 2774.
145. S. 373 § 2777; H.R. 820 § 2777; S. 644 § 2780; H.R. 1415 § 2780.
146. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
147. S. 373 § 2789; H.R. 820 § 2789; see also H.R. 1749, 105th Cong. (1997)
(creating a new federal cause of action under ERISA against MCOs). The Clinton
Administration is on record as supporting amendment of ERISA to permit suits against
MCOs. See Stuart Auerback, Law Guarding HMOs from Suit Challenged; Patients Find
Doctors Easier to Sue, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 1996, at Z8; Robert Pear, H. M. 0. 's Using
Federal Law to Deflect Malpractice Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1996, at A24.
148. A plaintiff wishing to sue an MCO may proceed under various theories, including
respondeat superior, corporate negligence, breach of contract, and fraud. See Malone &
Thaler, supra note 96, at 130-46. However, due to the existence of "corporate practice of
medicine" statutes in some states, a plaintiff may not be able to sue the MCO for coverage
denial decisions because such statutes effectively deem the MCO legally incapable of
practicing medicine; therefore, any harm resulting from the decision to treat or deny treatment
falls squarely on the shoulders of the treating physician, not the MCO. See Reuben, supra
note 96, at 56; see also BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., LIABILITY AND QUALITY ISSUES IN
HEALTH CARE 281-82 (1991).
149. See Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1490 (7th Cir. 1996);
Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1329 (5th Cir. 1992); see also 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a) (1994). The Supreme Court has interpreted the "relates to" language and its
corresponding preemption quite broadly, holding that a law relates to an employee benefit
plan (and therefore is preempted) if "it has a connection with or reference to such a plan."
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983). The lower federal courts, however, are
hopelessly split on the issue of the proper scope of ERISA preemption of various liability
theories levied against MCOs. See Frank L. Coan, Jr., Note, You Can't Get Therefrom
Here-Questioningthe Erosion of ERISA Preemption in Medical MalpracticeActions Against
HMOs, 30 GA. L. RE,. 1023, 1024 (1996); Laura H. Harshbarger, Note, ERISA Preemption
Meets the Age of Managed Care: Toward a Comprehensive Social Policy, 47 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 191, 191 (1996).
150. See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
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provider autonomy which are emerging from the political paradigm do not
come free of charge. Rising health care costs will inevitably follow, and the
question then becomes: how do we control health care costs in the long-run
without reverting once again to the provider or market paradigms and their
inherent abuses? This question will be explored extensively in the next
section.
III. THE FIDUCIARY PARADIGM
Once the paradigm dominance phenomenon has been identified and
accepted by policymakers, they will be in a position to rationally influence
health care decision-making in a positive way. The question, of course, is:
how?
One possible way to learn from the past and plan for a better future is
to devise a new paradigm that would give health care consumers (patients)
the power to fight for and receive quality health care when it is medically
necessary. Health care consumers are in desperate need of assistance in
understanding and fighting for their rights under increasingly complex laws,
regulations, and insurance contracts. A new, consumer-oriented paradigm
would provide a much-needed check on the power of payers and providers,
who have inherent incentives to underutilize or overutilize care. 5 ' Health
care consumer fiduciaries, in contrast to providers and payers, would act
solely in the best interests of health care consumers. 5 2  A fiduciary
151. Physicians, of course, are generally considered to have a fiduciary relationship
with their patients. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 796 (1983);
see also Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990). Indeed, the
Hippocratic Oath itself seems to establish such a fiduciary relationship. See5 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF BIOETHICS, supra note 57, at 2632. However, cost-containment mechanisms used by
MCOs-such as capitation and withholds and bonuses based on referral volume- undeniably
interject a degree of financial self-interest which holds the potential to conflict with the
physician's loyalty to the patient. See Michael J. Malinowski, Capitation, Advances in
Medical Technology, and the Advent of a New Era in Medical Ethics, 22 AM. J.L. & MED.
331, 339 (1996) ("The fates of patients cannot simply be entrusted to their physicians under
the assumption that doctors have the incentives and discretion to provide satisfactory care.");
see also Ruskin, supra note 66 (arguing that courts should engage in a financial risk analysis
of capitation arrangements to determine if the MCO's payment methodology effectively
controls the physician's clinical decision-making so as to justify the imposition of MCO
liability). Thus, barring the highly unlikely action of completely abolishing such cost-
containment mechanisms, physicians can no longer realistically be counted upon to act with
unrestricted loyalty to their patients, necessitating the appointment of a fiduciary who does
not face such conflicts. See Malinowski, supra, at 339.
152. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(l) (1959). Section 170(l)
establishes a duty of loyalty of trustees to "administer the trust solely in the interest of the
beneficiaries." Id. Moreover, the principle established by § 170(!) is "applicable not only
to trustees but to other fiduciaries." Id. cmt. a.
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paradigm would provide a new system of checks and balances to stabilize
and stop the dominance cycling of the provider, market, and political
paradigms.
What would such a fiduciary look like? It could take any number of
forms. Perhaps the first and most obvious form would be the establishment
of a governmental entity to serve as fiduciary. In these times of shrinking
budgets and correspondingly shrinking bureaucracies, however, the creation
of a new governmental entity would be expensive and therefore politically
unrealistic." 3
Another, less expensive alternative would be for the government (state
or federal) to contract with private organizations dedicated solely to assisting
consumers with health care coverage disputes. Such private organizations
could be empowered to make final determinations with regard to coverage
issues (subject to limited judicial review) and would likely provide more
expeditious determinations than a government bureaucracy. However, they,
too, would not be cheap. One way of funding such private fiduciary
organizations without raising taxes or reducing outlays in other governmen-
tal programs would be to require all insurers-whether traditional indemnity
or MCOs-to contract directly with fiduciaries that are federally or state
qualified. The process of state or federal qualification, not to mention
explicit statutory language establishing consumers as their principal, would
ensure that private fiduciaries are not beholden to insurers or MCOs.
Although the cost of contracting with private fiduciary organizations may
be passed along to health care consumers in the form of higher premiums,
the existence of fiduciaries could, in the long-run, reduce health care costs
by reducing the number of lawsuits filed for wrongful claim denials and
improving the health of consumers who would be more likely to receive
medically necessary care in a timely fashion.
A final alternative is to deem the MCO itself a fiduciary for its
enrollees. Although this may seem strange given the inherent conflicting
interests of the MCO, plaintiffs' lawyers are enjoying some success arguing
that MCOs governed by ERISA are fiduciaries which breach their duty of
loyalty by failing to reveal certain limitations or financial incentives placed
on plan physicians.'54  For example, in Shea v. Esensten,5 5 the Eighth
153. Indeed, a poll conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation and Harvard researcher
Robert Blendon in early 1998 found that, when asked who should protect managed care
consumers, only 23% of respondents said the primary responsibility should rest with the
government. See National Survey, supra note 138. Interestingly, however, support for
government responsibility rises to 51% when specific agencies, such as the Federal Aviation
Administration or the Securities and Exchange Commission, are mentioned. Id.
154. See Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 747 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Eddy is the
earliest case imposing a fiduciary duty upon a health insurer to affirmatively inform an
enrollee of material information. Id. Although Eddy involved a traditional indemnity
insurance defendant, its holding provided the basic analytical framework for later cases
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Circuit held that a medical group which had contracted with the plaintiffs
MCO was a fiduciary under ERISA and owed plan beneficiaries, such as the
plaintiff, a common law duty of loyalty, 5 6 as well as the specific statutory
obligation to discharge its duty solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries.' 57 Thus, the medical group's failure to reveal to enrollees
the existence of financial incentives to limit specialist referrals constituted
a breach of its fiduciary duty of loyalty. 58 Specifically, the Eighth Circuit
concluded:
From the patient's point of view, a financial incentive scheme put in place
to influence a treating doctor's referral practices when the patient needs
specialized care is certainly a material piece of information. This kind of
patient necessarily relies on the doctor's advice about treatment options,
and the patient must know whether the advice is influenced by self serving
financial considerations created by the health insurance provider....
Health care decisions involve matters of life and death, and an ERISA
fiduciary has a duty to speak out if it "knows that silence might be
harmful."' 59
Thus, under Shea, an MCO has a fiduciary duty to reveal any financial
incentives which might discourage its physicians from providing needed
care. This concept was followed by the district court in New Hampshire in
Drolet v. Healthsource, Inc.,' 60 a class action in which the plaintiff alleged
that the managed care plan offered by her employer breached its fiduciary
duty to enrollees by "egregiously misrepresent[ing] the nature of the
relationship between the [MCO] . . . and its contracting physicians."'
' 6'
Specifically, the plaintiff argued that language in the "Group Subscriber
Agreement" provided by the MCO did not reveal that physicians contracting
with the MCO were given bonuses of up to thirty-three percent in additional
income if they kept referrals, tests, and hospitalizations below a certain
level. 162
The MCO in Drolet moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
63
asserting that it owed no fiduciary duties to the plaintiffs because it was not
a plan administrator within the meaning of ERISA 4 The court rejected
extending fiduciary duty principles to MCOs.
155. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
156. Id. at 628 (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506-07 (1996)).
157. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)).
158. Id. at 629.
159. Id. at 628-29 (quoting Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund,
12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 1993)).
160. 968 F. Supp. 757 (D.N.H. 1997).
161. Id. at 758.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 760.
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this argument, finding that because the MCO admitted that it held the final
authority to decide benefit appeals, it exercised the necessary authority or
control over the plan to qualify as a plan administrator. 65 Thus, the court
denied the MCO's motion to dismiss, concluding that it owed the plaintiff
class a duty of loyalty, including a duty not to mislead and to disclose
material facts potentially adverse to the enrollee's interests.'
66
More recently, in Weiss v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc. , 167 a plaintiff
brought a class action against her employer-sponsored HMO, alleging that
the plan had violated its fiduciary duty under ERISA by, inter alia,
imposing gag clauses on its physicians;68 using capitation, withholds, and
bonuses to pressure physicians to under treat patients;"' and failing to
disclose to enrollees its physician compensation methodology. 70 CIGNA
moved to dismiss the suit for failure to state a claim,' 7' and the district
court granted the motion as to all of the plaintiffs claims except the claim
relating to the gag clause. 72 In upholding the legal viability of the gag
clause claim, the court concluded:
CIGNA acts in a fiduciary capacity-and therefore comes under the
obligations of loyalty imposed by ERISA-to the extent that it exercises
discretionary control over the communication of medical information to
Plan participants by their physicians. CIGNA's alleged policy of
restricting the disclosure of non-covered treatment options would, if true,
directly undermine the ability of plan participants to have unfettered access
to all relevant information relating to their physical or mental cohidition
and treatment options. Such a policy would thereby constitute a breach of
CIGNA's duty under ERISA to manage the Plan "solely in the interest of
the participants.' 73
Thus, although the court noted that the plaintiff had offered only "thin
evidence" that such a gag policy actually existed, it acknowledged the
165. Id. at 761; seealso 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994) (statingthat a fiduciary duty
is owed by any entity which "exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control
respecting management of such [a benefit] plan ... or . . .has any discretionary authority
or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan").
166. Drolet, 968 F. Supp. at 761-67.
167. 972 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
168. Id. at 751.
169. Id. at 752.
170. Id. at 753. The plaintiff in Weiss also alleged that CIGNA Healthplan's
contractual provisions breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at
751. The district court dismissed these claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure on grounds that such state tort claims were preempted by ERISA. Id. at 751-
52.
171. Id. at 750 (moving under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)).
172. Id. at 751-52.
173. Id. at 751 (footnote omitted).
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viability of the breach of fiduciary duty claim as applied to gag clauses and
left open the door for the plaintiff to prove the existence of such a policy
after conducting additional discovery.'7 4 In so holding, the court sent a
message that gag clauses may inherently violate the duty of loyalty imposed
upon ERISA plans, a message which, if accepted by future courts, could
essentially render moot state legislative reform efforts in this area."'
The Weiss decision is also notable for its rationale in dismissing the
plaintiff's remaining claims regarding physician compensation methods. The
gravamen of the plaintiffs claim was that, by paying its physicians via
-capitation combined with bonuses and withholds tied to referral patterns
(and failing to disclose such payment methodology to enrollees), CIGNA
violated its fiduciary duty to act solely in the interests of plan beneficia-
ries.7 6 In dismissing these claims, the court found that the plaintiff had
proffered no evidence that such payment methods actually coerced
physicians to act out of financial self-interest at the expense of patients.'7 7
While the court acknowledged that capitation, bonuses, and withholds
presented "dangers of abuse,"' 7 8 it concluded that, "to the extent that a
doctor takes advantage of financial incentives and withholds necessary care
from his or her patients, that doctor's ethical breach is not attributable to
CIGNA."'7 9 Such language seems reminiscent of the rationale behind
corporate practice of medicine statutes' 80 and is naive in regard to the
actual role of MCO payment methods in modem health care decision-
making. Perhaps the court's true motives for rejecting these claims lie not
in such naive assumptions, but in its admission that acknowledging the
legitimacy of the plaintiffs claims would be "tantamount to a claim that
risk-sharing arrangements in managed care are inherently illegal,"'' and
its unwillingness to tackle an issue which is "best suited for resolution by
branches of government other than the judiciary."'8' 2
The Weiss court explicitly refused to follow the holdings in Shea and
Drolet, 83 reasoning that the fiduciary's duty to disclose material facts
extended only so far as to require the fiduciary not to lie when asked
174. Id. at 752.
175. See supra Part II.B.3.




180. See supra note 148.
181. Weiss, 972 F. Supp. at 752.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 755 n.6; cf Maltz v. Aetna Health Plans of N.Y., Inc., 114 F.3d 9, 12 (2d
Cir. 1997) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying issuance of
a preliminary injunction against the MCO that had terminated a contract with pediatricians
on grounds that such termination did not breach the ERISA plan's fiduciary duty of loyalty
to the parent).
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questions by enrollees. 84  Under this reasoning, a fiduciary must be
truthful when questioned, but has no affirmative duty to disclose material
information-such as physician incentive arrangements-on his or her own
initiative.'"5
The Weiss court's parsimonious view of a fiduciary's duty to furnish
information seems contrary to the common law. Under section 173 of the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, a "trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary
to give him upon his request at reasonable times complete and accurate
information., 186 However, comment d to section 173 makes it clear that
a trustee is "under a duty to communicate to the beneficiary material facts
affecting the interest of the beneficiary which he knows the beneficiary does
not know and which the beneficiary needs to know for his protection in
dealing with a third person with respect to his interest."'87  In its 1996
decision in Varity Corp. v. Howe,'88 the Supreme Court refused to decide
whether an ERISA fiduciary ever has an affirmative duty to disclose
material information absent a request from the enrollee. 89 Nonetheless,
a fair reading of comment d would seem to support the conclusion of the
Shea and Drolet courts that an MCO must inform its enrollees about a
physician's financial incentives to withhold care, since an enrollee arguably
"needs to know"'190 such information "for his protection in dealing with a
third person"191-namely, the physician. Given the emerging split of
opinion among the lower courts on this important issue, it seems likely that
the Supreme Court will ultimately grant certiorari in a future case to resolve
it. In the meantime, however, the law remains in flux.
Whatever the ultimate resolution of the scope of an ERISA fiduciary's
duty, however, such resolution will come slowly and, when it comes, will
only apply to ERISA plans, which cover only approximately sixty percent
184. Weiss, 972 F. Supp. at 754.
185. Id.
186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 152, § 173 (emphasis added);
see id. cmt. d ("Ordinarily the trustee is not under a duty to the beneficiary to furnish
information to him in the absence of a request for such information."). The common law of
trusts generally defines an ERISA fiduciary's obligations. See Central States, Southeast &
Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985) ("[R]ather
than explicitly enumerating all of the powers and duties of trustees and other fiduciaries,
Congress [in ERISA] invoked the common law of trusts to define the general scope of their
authority and responsibility."); H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 3-5, 11-13 (1973), reprintedin 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 935, 991-1019.
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 152, § 173 cmt. d.
188. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
189. Id. at 506 ("[W]e need not reach the question of whether ERISA fiduciaries have
any fiduciary duty to disclose truthful information on their own initiative ....").
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 152, § 173 cmt. d.
191. Id.
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of the non-elderly population with health insurance.' 92 Thus, any compre-
hensive, uniform policy regarding an MCO's fiduciary obligations will
require broader legislative action. Health care policymakers should,
therefore, consider establishing explicit statutory fiduciary obligations for all
health insurers, ERISA-qualified or not, to serve as a balance against the
inherent underutilization tendency of payers and the overutilization tendency
of providers. If such a fiduciary paradigm were established, health care
consumers would be more likely to receive medically necessary care,
achieving a normatively desirable equilibrium in the provider-patient-payer
triad.
IV. CONCLUSION
The era of the market paradigm has ended. In its place has emerged a
political paradigm, as politicians at both the state and federal level have
responded to consumer and provider complaints about the abuses of
managed care. Ultimately, however, the political paradigm, like the
provider and market paradigms before it, will go too far, expanding benefits
and provider autonomy to the point where health care costs are, once again,
out of control, potentially dismantling managed care as an effective cost-
containment mechanism.
If policymakers wish to end this paradigmatic cycling, a new force must
be interjected between the health care pay'or and the health care provider.
One way to achieve balance between the payer and provider is to interject
a fiduciary who acts on behalf of the patient, a neutral third party to
determine whether care is medically necessary.
Although some courts have recently begun to capitalize on the fiduciary
concept with regard to MCOs governed by ERISA, reliance on judicial
establishment of a meaningful fiduciary paradigm is unrealistic. Courts are
understandably loathe to expand MCO obligations absent legislative
authorization. Thus, judicial reinterpretation or expansion of ERISA's
fiduciary obligations in the name of protecting MCO enrollees-such as
occurred in Shea'93 and Drolet'94-will be slow and incremental at best.
192. See Karen Davis et al., Choice Matters: Enrollees' Views of Their Health Plans,
14 HEALTH AFF. 99, 100 (1995) (stating that as of 1994, 63% of the non-elderly population
received health insurance through an ERISA plan); cf Troyen A. Brennan, An Ethical
Perspective on Health Care Insurance Reform, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 37, 58 (1993) ("[A]s
much as sixty-five percent of the population is insured through an ERISA-qualified plan.").
An estimated three-quarters of all MCOs are ERISA-qualified. Barry R. Furrow, Managed
Care Organizations and Patient Injury: Rethinking Liability, 31 GA. L. REv. 419, 494
(1997).
193. See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, even if a majority of courts ultimately agree with Shea and
Drolet, such precedents would equalize paradigm influence only for
individuals enrolled in health plans governed by ERISA. If a fiduciary
paradigm is going to be successfully implemented, it should be enacted via
comprehensive legislation applicable to all health plans, not by piecemeal
legislation or limited judicial precedents.

